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The UK is home to a substantial number of heritage and tourist railways, which make a significant contribution to
their local economies. They are mostly constructed on the routes of closed lines, and include large numbers of
earthworks of uncertain construction and unknown strength. Recently, there have been earthwork collapses, most
notably on the Gloucester and Warwickshire Railway during 2010 and 2011. The Office of Rail Regulation has also
noted a number of safety incidents on heritage railways, all attributable to management failures. This paper
describes an analysis of the Victorian earthworks on the Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway, a five-mile-long heritage
railway in central Scotland. The analysis and risk prioritisation method used by Network Rail was found to be
unsuitable for direct application to heritage railways, owing to the different operating context. A new system was
therefore developed, removing some risk factors from the Network Rail approach, adding others, and modifying
further ones. The new system was successfully applied, and the Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway earthworks were found
to be generally stable and safe.
1. Introduction: safety risks on UK heritage
railways
In times when there is much talk of high-speed rail, it is worth
considering that the UK is home to a significant industry based
on low-speed rail – the heritage and tourist sector. There are
currently over 100 heritage railways (HRs), employing 2000 paid
staff and 18 000 volunteers, carrying 6.8 million passengers on 15
million passenger journeys, turning over £84 million, and con-
tributing an estimated £579 million to the UK economy (Lord
Faulkner, 2011).
Being passenger-carrying railways, HRs are subject to exactly the
same requirements for safety as any other passenger railway,
although they are generally restricted to speeds of 25 mph
(40 km/h) or less. Although they have much lower annual
tonnages of traffic than the mainline system, they use historic
steam and diesel locomotives, and consequently their axle loads
can be relatively high, typically of the order of 25 t. In most
cases, heritage railways occupy trackbeds formerly part of the
national rail network, often branch lines closed in the ‘Beeching
Cuts’ – the substantial reduction of the UK rail network carried
out while Dr Richard Beeching was chairman of British Rail in
the 1960s (British Railways Board, 1963a, 1963b). In common
with the rest of the UK network, their infrastructure often dates
from a time when there was relatively little theoretical under-
standing, design or quality control, and typically no records exist
either of construction or of maintenance. Further, although HRs
sometimes rely on a core of paid employees, they are generally
staffed by volunteer enthusiasts who come from a wide range of
backgrounds, and in many cases do not have either long
experience or formal technical qualifications.
The UK HR sector has a good record of safety. From 1951 to
2010 there was a year-on-year reduction in safety incidents.
However, over the two years after that there was a significant
reversal, with reportable incidents on over 20 railways, some staff
fatalities and eight Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) enforcement
notices, all of which are traceable to failings in the management
structure of HRs (Keay, 2012). The ORR regards this as so
serious that special seminars were arranged via the Heritage
Railway Association in an attempt to prevent further accidents.
There have also been notable failures of earthworks. The Severn
Valley Railway (SVR) was subject to a series of major earth-
work failures following abnormally high rainfall events in June
and July 2007, costing £3.7 million to repair (Sowden, 2012),
and the Gloucester and Warwickshire Railway (G&WR), which
occupies a 10 mile (16 km) former British Railways (BR) route
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between Toddington and Cheltenham Racecourse in central
England, experienced two severe slips, at Gotherington in April
2010 and at Chicken Curve near Winchcombe in early 2011.
Both slips occurred in embankments where drainage was an
issue, and which had given trouble and required ongoing
maintenance in BR days and before (see http://www.gwst.com).
Fortunately, neither the SVR nor the G&WR incident led to loss
of life.
2. The Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway
The Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway (B&KR) (see http://
www.bkrailway.co.uk) is a 5 mile (8 km) HR running from
Bo’ness to a junction with the Network Rail (NR) Edinburgh and
Glasgow mainline. The HR was opened in stages from the early
1980s, but occupies the line of the Slammanan and Borrowstoun-
ness (Bo’ness) Railway opened in 1851. A map showing the
location of the railway is included as Figure 1.
Figure 1. Map of the Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway. # Crown
Copyright/database right 2013. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA
supplied service
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For 1.5 miles (2.4 km) of its length, the line occupies the side of
a steep escarpment close to the Forth Estuary between Bo’ness
and Grangemouth, with the track supported on the north side by
steep earth embankments, typically 15 m high, and cut on the
south side by soil and in some places rock slopes up to 10 m high
(Figure 2). Thereafter the line turns south, passing through some
moderately deep cuttings and over two further sections of
embankment before reaching the mainline junction at Manuel.
All the earth and rock structures have been subject to somewhat
irregular, but reasonably frequent, inspections by independent
competent persons (i.e. qualified permanent way/engineering staff
not having a direct interest in the railway), including in March
2010 and May 2011, and are considered safe. However, they are
almost all heavily vegetated, occasionally subject to animal
burrowing, and generally wet. No details of their construction or
historic maintenance survive, although there is evidence of past
failure due to washout in places, and at one point the installation
of a pipeline has led to a reconstruction. It cannot therefore be
claimed that they represent a zero risk.
Any failure of the B&KR earthworks, in addition to putting
passengers and railway staff at risk, would have a very serious
impact on business: apart from the heritage passenger trains,
access is required to the mainline junction for movements of rail
tour coaching stock, which brings in considerable revenue to the
line’s owners.
In view of this, and bearing in mind the events described at the
SVR and G&WR, together with the ORR’s concerns with
management structures for safety, it has been determined that a
proper risk-based assessment procedure is appropriate for the
B&KR earthworks. The assessment procedure has to be commen-
surate with the HR operation, be based on HR safety and business
priorities, and bear in mind the volunteer staff who will operate
it, and the low speed, low traffic and low resource availability
context of the B&KR and HR sector in general.
The aim of this study was therefore to develop a risk assessment
procedure for earthworks that is applicable to the HR sector,
bearing its nature in mind, and to apply this to the B&KR and
use it to determine any monitoring or remedial actions necessary.
3. Previous work on earthworks risk
assessment
3.1 The Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway
Recent inspection reports by independent competent persons have
noted that the B&KR earthworks ‘appear generally stable’, while
noting the presence of mature slips and other minor issues
(Watson, 2010, 2011). There is, however, currently no prioritisa-
tion of inspection or maintenance activity on the B&KR, and
previous interventions have been largely reactive to incidents or
perceived problems.
3.2 Network Rail
NR employs a risk-based approach to the prioritisation of earth-
works. This is a two-stage process, commencing with an analysis
and scoring of the geotechnical hazard of various types of failure.
These geotechnical hazard scores are then converted to a like-
lihood of failure score, and used in a prioritisation algorithm that
combines it with various potential consequences of failure. The
process is explained in more detail in the following paragraphs.
3.3 Geotechnical hazard
For earth slopes, NR uses the Soil Slope Hazard Index (SSHI)
(Manley and Harding, 2003). The entire network is divided into
5 chain (approximately 100 m) lengths, and each side of the
railway is considered separately. A site inspection is carried out
by a trained operative, who examines over 30 separate parameters
covering earthwork type, size and shape, vegetation and drainage,
as well as indicators of ongoing or potential failure, such as
tension cracks, angled trees, the presence of animal burrows, and
other risk factors such as a history of track misalignment, past
interventions or mining in the area. The values noted against the
various factors are recorded using a TrimbleTM hand-held compu-
ter with an inbuilt camera for photographing observations.
The observed parameters are then fed into an algorithm derived
by Manley and Harding (2003) to determine the SSHI. This
accounts for five principal mechanisms in which earthworks can
fail – rotational, translational, earthflow, washout and burrowing
– and scores each section inspected for each of these mechan-
isms. The highest geotechnical hazard score (i.e. the highest risk
score) obtained is used to classify an individual 100 m length as
either serviceable, marginal or poor for the failure mechanism to
which the score corresponds.
For rock slopes, a related process is used to assess the stability of
Figure 2. The Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway, showing typical cutting
and embankment structure
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the rock, based on the Rail Rock Slope Risk Appraisal (RRSRA)
(McMillan and Manley, 2003).
Poor slopes are then reinspected at least every 2 years, marginal
slopes every 5 years, and serviceable slopes every 10 years.
3.4 Prioritisation calculation
Having determined the numerical geotechnical hazard score, this
is then fed into a more general prioritisation algorithm derived by
(Mott MacDonald and Network Rail, 2006). This algorithm
considers the likelihood and consequences of different potential
failure mechanisms against four categories weighted for their
relative significance, as shown in Table 1: safety, value for
money, disruption and environment.
In addition to the geotechnical hazard, a variety of other factors
contribute to these consequences, including track condition and
the significance of temporary speed restrictions (TSRs), track
layout (straight, curved or switches and crossings), geographical
weather risk, past failures, route speed, potential delay costs, and
the availability of alternative routes. Some of these are assessed
on site and some by means of a desk study, but all must be
determined for each 5 chain length of one side of the railway.
Each factor contributes to some or all of the various consequences
based on a relative scoring scheme, developed through a wide-
ranging consultation and testing exercise by (Mott MacDonald
and Network Rail, 2006) (see Table 2). For example, in terms of
the geotechnical failure mode, potential rockfall and washout
failures count for 24 (high risk) against all four consequence
categories, whereas burrowing and earthflow count for 13 and 11
respectively (lower risk). Cuttings are scored at 18, a greater risk
than embankments at 14. On the other hand, route speed
contributes only to safety and disruption, and not to value for
Consequence
category
Definition Weighting
Safety The level of safety of the travelling public, NR staff or third parties 0.4
Value for money The optimum combination of whole-life cost and quality 0.25
Disruption The effect of disruption to the NR network, by delay minutes, adverse publicity, or other factors 0.25
Environment A positive or detrimental effect on the environment 0.1
Table 1. Network Rail consequence categories (Mott MacDonald
and Network Rail, 2006)
Category Parameter Safety Value for
money
Disruption Environmental Hazard options Scoring
Geotechnical
information
Earthwork
type
3 3 3 3 Embankment 14
Cutting 18
Bund (i.e. not supporting track) 6
Failure mode 3 3 3 3 Rockfall 24
Rotation 19
Translation 19
Earthflow 11
Washout 24
Burrowing 13
Subsidence/Settlement 16
Predicted
earthwork
condition
trend
3 3 3 3 No significant deterioration 0
Gradual deterioration 4
Rapid deterioration 6
Table 2. Network Rail prioritisation scoring (Mott MacDonald and
Network Rail, 2006) (continued on next page)
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Category Parameter Safety Value for
money
Disruption Environmental Hazard options Scoring
Track
condition
Track
recording
vehicle (TRV)
data: current
track
condition
3 3 Green – good 0
Yellow – satisfactory 1
Blue – poor 2
Red – very poor 4
Cyan – super red 6
TRV data:
trends
3 3 No significant deterioration 0
Gradual deterioration 2
Rapid deterioration 4
Risk of
temporary
speed
restrictions
3 3 3 N/A 0
Low risk 3
Medium risk 6
High risk 9
Track layout Track layout 3 3 Straight track/flat curve 2
Curve: high cant/cant deficiency 4
S&C/tilting curve 5
Geographic
weather risk
Geographic
weather risk
(including
flooding
potential)
3 3 Very high 7
High 6
Medium 4
Low 2
Past failures Past failures 3 3 No previous local failures or normalised
delay minutes 0–60%
3
Some known local failures or normalised
delay minutes 60–90%
5
Extensive local failures or normalised
delay minutes 90–100%
7
Consequence
potential
Route
sensitivity
3 3 Very high: primary route 8
High (London commuter routes and
main secondary routes)
7
Medium (secondary routes) 5
Low (rural) 3
Very low (freight) 1
Impact on
other assets
3 3 3 3 Track 4
OHLE 3
Power/telecom cables/signalling 3
Signalling equipment 4
NR Structures 1
Third-party structures 1
Table 2. (continued on next page)
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money or environment, with (obviously) higher speeds scoring a
higher number of risk points than lower ones (2 for 0–79 mph, 5
for 80–99 mph, 8 for 100–110 mph and 9 for 111–125 mph)
(1 mph ¼ 1.6 km/h).
The risk points scored by each parameter against each conse-
quence category are summed, and the total is multiplied by the
weighting of the consequence category (Table 1). The four
products are then summed to determine a total prioritisation
score. The highest score is taken as the highest risk priority for
monitoring and engineering intervention. Full details of the
original NR consequence scoring are included in Table 2.
This risk-based analysis has passed its accreditation process, it is
Category Parameter Safety Value for
money
Disruption Environmental Hazard options Scoring
Route speed 3 3 0–79 mph 2
80–99 mph 5
100–110 mph 8
111–125 mph 9
Infrastructure
flexibility
3 3 U/D (i.e. single bidirectional) 8
UD 7
UUDD 5
UDUD 3
Potential
delay costs
3 3 High 7
Medium 4
Low 1
Legal
requirements
Third-party
liabilities/legal
obligations
3 3 3 Very significant 7
Significant 5
Not significant 0
Environmental
obligations
3 3 3 Very significant 4
Significant 3
Not significant 0
Available
mitigations
Drainage,
vegetation,
TSR,
watchmen,
track
maintenance
etc.
3 3 3 3 Feasible long-term: low cost 0
Feasible long-term: high cost 4
Feasible short-term: low cost 6
Feasible short-term: high cost 8
Not feasible 9
Other projects Opportunities
provided by
other projects
3 3 3 3 High 4
Medium 2
Low 1
None 0
Drivers from
other projects
3 3 3 3 Significant constraints 7
Moderate constraints 5
Minor constraints 3
N/A 0
Table 2. (continued)
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credible to senior earthwork engineers, and it has been used by
NR for a decade. In 2008, following three separate incidents
involving earthworks failures, an investigation by the Rail
Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) concluded that the SSHI
algorithm as adopted by Network Rail was technically sound, but
noted a number of issues regarding its implementation, princi-
pally related to variations in practices in different localities, and
the lack of a significant number of data points (i.e. earthwork-
related incidents) to form a scientific judgement (RAIB, 2008).
4. Assessing the Bo’ness and Kinneil
Railway
The NR approach was the obvious starting point for a logical and
complete assessment of the B&KR earthworks. However, the NR
methodology had to be adapted, since access to the TrimbleTM –
or indeed any hand-held computer – was not possible. The
parameters were therefore set out on a paper questionnaire,
exactly as in the original NR scheme. The first 1.5 miles (2.4 km)
of railway from Bo’ness station to where it passes under the main
Bo’ness–Grangemouth road is on flat land (the foreshore area)
with no earthworks present, so this section was excluded from the
study. The remainder of the railway was divided into 114 sections
of length approximately 100 m, each section being one side of
the railway only.
A questionnaire was filled in for each section. Questions to do
with underlying geology and adjacent catchment area were
answered by means of a preliminary desk study, the remainder
being addressed on site during two visits to the line on 21
November and 5 December 2011, when engineering possessions
and associated protection arrangements ensured that there was no
safety risk from train movements. Subsequently, the responses
were transferred to a spreadsheet, which was in turn programmed
to implement the SSHI algorithm and the prioritisation process.
5. Initial results and discussion
The completion of the analysis, particularly filling in the ques-
tionnaire at the line side, is a process that clearly requires
training. In this instance the authors carrying out the work were
final-year undergraduate MEng civil engineering students. They
took some time to get used to the process, but thereafter found
completion of the questionnaires to be relatively straightforward,
based on geotechnical engineering knowledge acquired during the
preceding years of their degree programme.
5.1 SSHI results
The SSHI (i.e. the geotechnical hazard) results are summarised in
Table 3. Of the poor slopes, most were cutting slopes (i.e. above
rail level) on the south side of the railway, with some being
cutting slopes located south of Birkhill Station, on both sides of
the railway. Only a few were embankment slopes (below rail
level) located near where the railway turns south away from the
Forth Estuary. A variety of potential failure modes were exhibited,
with some of the high, steep embankment slopes giving indica-
tions of rotational and translational failure, and some of the
cutting slopes additionally appearing vulnerable to washout and
earth flow type failures.
It is stressed that a result of poor does not mean that the
earthwork presents an immediate safety hazard; it is rather an
indication that monitoring is needed on at least a biennial basis to
avoid a risk developing.
5.2 Initial prioritisation
In order to prioritise possible interventions on the B&KR earth-
works, the prioritisation toolkit was applied using all the original
NR scheme unaltered. The main results of this analysis are shown
in Figure 3, in which the prioritisation of earthworks is indicated
by the large boxed numbers, with 1 indicating the earthwork
section with the highest priority for monitoring and possible
intervention. Some areas have equal priority, and thus the same
number appears twice; the priorities shown are not all consecu-
tively numbered, as some of the priorities between 1 and 17 were
on sections of the railway not covered by the figure.
In this result, the top priority is at a location where there has
been previous disturbance due to excavation for an oil pipeline
crossing in the 1980s, and the consequence includes possible
impact on the pipeline. This therefore appears to make sense.
However, many of the next priorities are cutting sides on the
south side of the railway. Applying engineering judgement, the
prioritisation of these areas makes much less sense, since
examination on site, together with the experience of some small
past failures, suggested that the cutting sides could collapse with
no significant consequence to third parties, there being only
woodland or agricultural land on the top side of the cutting.
There is also a wide area by the line side to accommodate any
debris, and if any debris did fall on the rails, the visibility for
train crews was generally sufficient to achieve a controlled stop
SSHI geotechnical
hazard
Number of 100 m lengths of
one side of railway
Percentage of all slopes on
railway
Poor 25 22
Marginal 49 43
Serviceable 40 35
Table 3. SSHI Results for Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway
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in the distance available, given the 20 mph (32 km/h) maximum
line speed in the area.
On the other hand, the embankment slopes given the 10th, 13th,
15th and 17th priorities had poor SSHIs, and engineering
judgement suggested that any failure here could have a major
impact on the railway. This would include undermining the track
formation, severing the line and causing all income-generating
operations to cease, as well as presenting a safety risk to trains
and in some cases to owners of domestic property positioned
below the railway.
In view of this, it was decided to reassess the prioritisation
approach in the light of needs specific to HR operation. This was
done with the assistance of a focus group consisting of ex-NR
civil engineers, currently practising independent competent per-
sons with both NR and HR experience, and civil engineers with
earthwork experience outside the rail environment.
5.3 Adapting NR risk weightings to HRs
A number of issues were found when applying the NR prioritisa-
tion in an HR context. In terms of the four generic consequence
categories (Table 1), the presence of environmental appeared to
be over-emphasised for HRs. This is not to say that HRs do not
take environmental impact seriously, but in general this impact is
probably low, and is strongly linked with factors such as tourism
and traffic to access their stations. Thus use of environmental as a
consequence category is unlikely to make significant distinction
between priorities for earthwork monitoring or intervention. In
the NR system, as well as environmental being a consequence
category (Table 1), environmental obligations is a parameter
considered under legal obligations (Table 2), and it was felt that
its presence here was sufficient for HRs without including it as a
separate consequence category as well.
Further, the value for money consequence was thought to be too
complex, and was therefore simplified to financial, covering the
actual cost of repair of a damaged earthwork. Disruption was also
modified, since detail such as delay minutes is less relevant to
HR operations as no fines are payable to train operating
companies. Instead, disruption was used to consider indirect costs
such as loss of income, the inability to run trains (including
engineering trains), and impacts on the reputation of the indivi-
dual railway or the HR movement in general.
Accordingly, the consequence categories were redefined for use
on HRs, as shown in Table 4.
The prioritisation scoring factors used by NR (Table 2) then
needed to be adapted to the new consequence categories shown
in Table 4. Further issues were also identified with the prioritisa-
tion scoring factors, as described in the following sections.
5.3.1 Geotechnical information
NR prioritises cuttings over embankments for statistical reasons,
as more accidents have occurred as a result of cutting failure
(RAIB, 2008). For similar reasons, rockfalls and washouts are
given a higher priority over other types of failure. However, these
statistics, derived from NR operations, will not necessarily have
any bearing on HR operations, where conditions – and line
11
9
N
200 m
1
13
12
7
17
10
15
15
4
2
5
3
Figure 3. Earthworks prioritisation based on Network Rail
weightings. Base map # Crown Copyright/database right 2013.
An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service
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information becomes available in the future) it was thought more
appropriate to consider all these factors equally. NR also uses a
geotechnical engineer’s assessment of earthwork (and rock slope)
condition and trend as part of the geotechnical scoring, and this
is unlikely to be generally available to many HRs, which do not
have geotechnical specialists available to make routine assess-
ments.
5.3.2 Track condition
NR considers track condition, including geometry, trends and
risks of TSRs with impact on train operating companies (TOCs)
in its risk assessment; however, these factors are less relevant to
HRs. Track condition is likely to be generally poorer than
mainline standards, but matters less at low line speeds, and the
financial penalties of a TSR are also not relevant when line speed
limits are always less than 25 mph (40 km/h).
5.3.3 Consequence potential
In this general category, the NR system considers route sensitiv-
ity, which covers the availability of a diversion for through traffic.
This is clearly irrelevant to HRs. Route speed, flexibility of
wrong-line running on multiple tracks and potential delay
payments to TOCs are also not relevant.
5.3.4 Other projects
Although not irrelevant, the treatment of opportunities and drivers
associated with other projects were thought to be overly complex
for HR implementation, and suitable for simplification.
On the other hand, it was considered that there were a number of
factors relevant to HRs that were not included in the NR system.
These are as follows.
5.3.5 Site access
On the B&KR, and many other heritage railways, access for plant
and personnel to repair a damaged earthwork, particularly if the
railway itself was no longer passable, would be a serious issue.
This was, in fact, a notable issue in the repairs to the SVR after
the 2007 flooding (Sowden, 2012). It is therefore more important
to maintain difficult-to-access earthworks in a serviceable state
than is the case for the more accessible ones.
5.3.6 Detectability of failure
A key issue for HRs is the likelihood of incipient failure being
detected; this will have a clear impact on the safety consequence,
and is likely to be more variable on HRs relying on volunteer
staff with diverse responsibilities, as opposed to NR, where there
is a clearly set-out inspection programme, with dedicated staff to
administer it. Some earthworks and rock slopes will be more
frequently observed, for example those near staffed stations,
whereas features in more remote locations, where there is heavy
vegetation or features above cutting horizons, are less likely to be
noticed. It was thought that this variability should be included in
a risk assessment for HRs.
5.3.7 Shared responsibility
This factor was added to account for situations such as the
pipeline crossing on the B&KR, where the earthwork, and
consequently any repairs, would be a shared responsibility with
the pipeline operators. In general, this will apply in many HR
contexts, such as where the earthwork supports a highway bridge
structure or adjacent road.
5.4 New prioritisation for the B&KR
In view of the foregoing discussion, a revised prioritisation
scoring against the new consequence categories (Table 4) was
prepared that it is thought more accurately reflects the situation
on the B&KR and on other HRs. This is detailed in Table 5. For
factors that are unaltered from the original system, the scoring
remains the same. For new categories, scores have been deter-
mined based on engineering judgement of their relative signifi-
cance.
For added clarity, a comparison of the original NR scheme and the
new prioritisation scheme is shown, without scoring, in Table 6.
6. Revised results
The new HR prioritisation scheme was applied to the B&KR. No
change was made to the SSHI calculation, for which the results
remain as shown in Table 3. These were used with the conse-
quence factors in Table 5 to calculate revised priorities for
monitoring and engineering intervention.
The revised priorities are indicated in Figure 4. They now tie in
Consequence
category
Definition Weighting
Safety The level of safety of the travelling public, HR staff or third parties 0.4
Financial The direct costs resulting from an earthwork failure: e.g. the cost of repair of an earthwork and
any damages incurred by the failure including third parties
0.25
Disruption Indirect costs of failure such as loss of earnings due to inability to run passenger services; the
inability to run trains, including works trains; and the effect on the reputation of the HR or the HR
movement generally
0.35
Table 4. New heritage railway consequence categories
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Category Parameter Safety Financial Disruption Hazard options Scoring
Geotechnical
information
Failure mode 3 3 3 Rockfall 24
Rotation 19
Translation 19
Earthflow 11
Washout 24
Burrowing 13
Subsidence/settlement 16
Site access 3 3 3 Easy 0
Moderate 5
Obstructed 9
Detectability 3 3 3 High 0
Medium 2
Low 4
Track layout Track layout 3 3 Straight track/flat curve 2
Curve: high cant/cant deficiency 4
S&C 5
Geographic
weather risk
Geographic weather
risk (including flooding
potential)
3 3 Very high 7
High 6
Medium 4
Low 2
Past failures Past failures 3 3 No previous local failures or
normalised delay minutes 0–60%
3
Some known local failures or
normalised delay minutes 60–90%
5
Extensive local failures or normalised
delay minutes 90–100%
7
Impact on other assets 3 3 3 Track 4
Power/telecom cables/signalling 3
Signalling equipment 4
NR structures 1
Third-party structures 1
Legal
requirements
Third-party liabilities/
legal obligations
3 3 Very significant 7
Significant 5
Not significant 0
Environmental
obligations
3 3 Very significant 4
Significant 3
Not significant 0
Shared responsibility 3 3 Yes 0
No 3
Available
mitigations
Drainage, vegetation,
TSR, watchmen, track
maintenance etc.
3 3 3 Feasible long-term: low cost 0
Feasible long-term: high cost 4
Feasible short-term: low cost 6
Feasible short-term: high cost 8
Not feasible 9
Other projects Opportunities and
drivers provided by
other projects
3 3 3 High 7
Medium 5
Low 3
None 0
Table 5. New heritage railway prioritisation scoring
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Category Original NR prioritisation factors New HR prioritisation factors
Parameter Safety Value for
money
Disruption Environmental Parameter Safety Financial Disruption
Geotechnical
information
Earthwork type 3 3 3 3
Failure mode 3 3 3 3 Failure mode 3 3 3
Predicted earthwork condition trend 3 3 3 3
Site access 3 3 3
Detectability 3 3 3
Track condition Track recording vehicle (TRV) data:
current track condition
3 3
TRV data: trends 3 3
Risk of temporary speed restrictions 3 3 3
Track layout Track layout 3 3 Track layout 3 3
Geographic weather
risk
Geographic weather risk (including
flooding potential)
3 3 Geographic weather risk
(including flooding
potential)
3 3
Past failures Past failures 3 3 Past failures 3 3
Consequence
potential
Route sensitivity 3 3
Impact on other assets 3 3 3 3 Impact on other assets 3 3 3
Route speed 3 3
Infrastructure flexibility 3 3
Potential delay costs 3 3
Legal requirements Third-party liabilities/legal obligations 3 3 3 Third-party liabilities/legal
obligations
3 3
Environmental obligations 3 3 3 Environmental obligations 3 3
Shared responsibility 3 3
Available mitigations Drainage, vegetation, TSR,
watchmen, track maintenance etc.
3 3 3 3 Drainage, vegetation, TSR,
watchmen, track
maintenance etc.
3 3 3
Other projects Opportunities provided by other
projects
3 3 3 3
Drivers from other projects 3 3 3 3
Opportunities and drivers
provided by other projects
3 3 3
Table 6. Comparison between original NR and new HR consequence factors1
1
G
e
o
te
ch
n
ica
l
E
n
g
in
e
e
rin
g
V
o
lu
m
e
1
6
6
Issu
e
G
E1
E
a
rth
w
o
rk
s
risk
a
sse
ssm
e
n
t
o
n
a
h
e
rita
g
e
ra
ilw
a
y
C
rap
p
er,
Fell
an
d
G
am
m
o
h
P
R
O
O
F
S
much more effectively with engineering judgement, the high,
steep and sometimes wet embankment slopes north of the railway
being given the highest priorities. If damaged, these embankments
would potentially undermine the line, perhaps in a way not
immediately noticeable from the driving cab of an approaching
train, and they might result in collapse onto line-side property.
The resulting disruption would entirely remove the railway’s
access to an income stream either from sale of passenger tickets
or from revenue associated with rail tour movements, for which
mainline access from Bo’ness station is required.
6.1 Monitoring and remediation
The application of the SSHI calculation and revised prioritisation
merely calculates a relative risk for given sections of earthwork
or rock slope. It does not indicate the presence or absence of an
absolute problem; this determination will always rely on on-site
inspection by suitably qualified engineers. In the case of the
B&KR this has been done, being formally reported in Watson
(2011) and informally on more recent occasions. There have been
minor issues connected with the need to repair drainage ditching,
and minor slips associated with large trees being uprooted by
winter gales, but the underlying stability of all the earth and rock
slopes is not currently in question.
However, in the light of the collapses on the SVR and G&WR
previously mentioned, and bearing in mind the railway’s responsi-
bility for the safety of its staff, passengers and neighbours, it is
appropriate to take steps to manage any potential risk. It is
therefore proposed to repeat the risk assessment inspections on a
regular basis.
It was notable in both the SVR and G&WR cases that failures
were related to drainage issues, where in some cases the existence
and operation of culverts was previously unknown (Sowden,
2012). A careful investigation of all drainage structures on the
B&KR has thus been carried out to ensure that this situation is
less likely to arise.
Further, it is commonly noted that earthwork failure is rarely
sudden or without warning (e.g. Bonnett, 2005, section 6.5, p85),
and simple monitoring techniques are available to give early
warning, the most obvious one being telltales, which consist of a
number of pegs set out in a straight line. Any significant
movement of the earthwork would result in pegs moving out of
line, which would be readily observable even by an unqualified
staff member. The matter could then be further investigated, and
potential consequences reduced. Four sets of telltales have there-
fore been placed in priority areas 1 to 4, as shown in Figure 4,
and will be inspected regularly, with the distance from the
running edge of the rail and track cant being monitored at each
peg (Figure 5).
7. Conclusion and further work
A risk assessment has been carried out on the Bo’ness and
Kinneil Railway with the aim of managing potential hazards
associated with earthworks and rock slopes supporting a HR.
N
200 m
20
12
2
16
9
3
5
4
4
4
12
7
1
6
25
Figure 4. Earthworks prioritisation based on Heritage Railway
weightings. Base map # Crown Copyright/database right 2013.
An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service
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Techniques used by NR to calculate a SSHI and prioritise risk
were found to be unsuitable for HR application, owing to the
irrelevance of a number of factors used in determining the
severity of potential consequences, and the absence of other
factors important to HR operations. A revised approach was
created, taking into account the specific context in which HRs
work, and the revised prioritisation gave risk results that related
well to engineering judgement regarding the structures in ques-
tion.
It is concluded that at present the earth and rock slopes on the
B&KR are not a cause for concern; however, the revised risk
management process works well, and should be applied regularly,
with the highest-risk slopes being subject to more frequent formal
inspection and recording, with the assistance of simple monitor-
ing techniques to give early warning of any slope movement. This
will provide continued reassurance that the B&KR formation
remains safe for traffic.
Work on this project is continuing, to provide a more user-
friendly method of implementation commensurate with volunteer
inspectors in a HR environment, and to trial the method on other
HRs, which may lead to further developments in the prioritisation
scoring, particularly for the new factors introduced as part of this
work.
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